Should R&D Champions be Protected from Foreign Takeovers? by Bertrand, Olivier et al.
 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 55665 

















IFN Working Paper No. 772, 2008 
 
 
Should R&D Champions be Protected from 
Foreign Takeovers?   
Olivier Bertrand, Katariina Nilsson Hakkala,      
Pehr-Johan Norbäck and Lars Persson 
 
 Should R&D Champions be Protected from Foreign Takeovers?∗




We analyze how the entry mode of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) aﬀects aﬃliate R&D
activities. Using unique aﬃliate level data for Swedish multinational ﬁrms, we ﬁrst present
empirical evidence that acquired aﬃliates have a higher level of R&D intensity than greenﬁeld
(start-up) aﬃliates. This gap persists over time and with the age of the aﬃliates, as well as
for diﬀerent ﬁrm types and industries. To explain this ﬁnding, we develop an acquisition-
investment-oligopoly model where we show that for a foreign acquisition to take place in
equilibrium, the acquiring MNE must invest suﬃciently in sequential R&D in the aﬃliate.
Otherwise, rivals will expand their business, thus making the acquisition unproﬁtable. Two
additional predictions of the model — that foreign ﬁrms acquire high-quality domestic ﬁrms
and that the gap in R&D between acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates decreases in acquisition
transaction costs — are consistent with the data.
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Foreign direct investments (FDI) play a key role in today’s global economy.1 Many countries
encourage inﬂows of greenﬁeld FDI (i.e. start-ups), in particular in R&D industries, with the
motivation that they will give rise to positive externalities and future R&D investments. For
example, the Government of Alabama paid the equivalent of $150,000 per employee to Mercedes
for locating its new plant in the state in 19942 a n dt h eB r i t i s hG o v e r n m e n tp r o v i d e da ne s t i m a t e d
$30,000 and $50,000 per employee to attract Samsung and Siemens, respectively, to the North
East of England in the late 1990s.3
At the same time, there is a concern about foreign acquisitions4 of certain types of domestic
ﬁrms.5 Most countries have regulations that can block foreign acquisitions for national security
reasons. For instance, in the US, the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act
authorizes the US President to block acquisitions of US companies by foreign interests for national
security reasons. However, many countries have recently been re-evaluating their regulations
of foreign acquisitions and consider extending the protection of ﬁrms in strategic industries,
including R&D industries.6 For instance, in 2005, the rumors about a takeover bid of the French
dairy producer Danone by the American compan yP e p s i C op r o v o k e da no u t c r yo nt h eF r e n c h
political arena. A few weeks later, the French government oﬃcially proposed to shield ten
”strategic” industries, including biotechnologies, and secure information systems from foreign
acquisitions. Similar processes have recently taken place in several countries including Canada,
China, Italy and USA.7
1There has been an increase in FDI relative to GDP in the last few decades. FDI has not only grown faster
than GDP, it has also outpaced the growth of world trade in this period. See Barba Navaretti (2004).
2See Head (1998).
3See Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin (2001).
4At the end of the 1990’s, nearly 90 percent of the FDI transactions in developed countries were cross-border
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). In the 1998-2001 period, the share was 36% in developing and transition
economies and 76% in the world as a whole (computed from UNCTAD, FDI/TNC Database by Barba Navaretti
and Venables, 2004).
5See references in Mattoo et al. (2004).
6See Graham and Marchick (2006).
7See ”China adopts anti-monopoly law”, August 30, 2007, China Daily, ”Canadians worried about foreign
takeovers, want action: poll”, September 7, 2007, CBC news, ”Bank chief in Italy oﬀ EU hook?”, International
Herald Tribune, Business, September 17, 2005, ”America for Sale, 2 Outcomes When Foreigners Buy Factories”,
April 7, 2008, New York Times and Graham and Marchick (2006).
2In this paper, we examine this policy issue by empirically and theoretically investigating how
the entry mode of FDI has had an impact on aﬃliate R&D activities in the host country.
Using unique micro data on R&D investments in foreign aﬃliates of Swedish multinational
enterprises in 34 countries over the period 1970—1998, we ﬁrst ﬁnd evidence that:8
• Acquired aﬃliates have a higher level of R&D intensity (and are more likely to perform
R&D) than greenﬁeld aﬃliates. This gap persists over time and with the age of aﬃliates,
as well as for diﬀerent ﬁrm types and industries.
• While cross-border M&As became the dominating entry mode in the 1990’s, we ﬁnd that
the gap in favor of the R&D intensity of acquired aﬃliates was larger in the 1970’s than
in the 1990’s.
We then develop a theoretical model to explain these empirical facts. Our model has the
following key ingredients: there are several MNEs which may enter a host country market by
either acquiring a domestic ﬁrm or setting up a new plant from scratch (i.e. greenﬁeld investment).
All ﬁrms in the market then invest in new (sequential) R&D assets and compete in an oligopolistic
product market. The domestic ﬁrm possesses unique R&D assets, which may be of diﬀerent initial
quality. The level of complementarity between the foreign owners’ assets and the domestic R&D
assets may vary.
We ﬁrst show that for an acquisition to take place, the asset complementarity between the
assets of the acquirer and the target ﬁrm must be suﬃciently high. The reason is that when
the complementarity is high, the acquiring MNE will invest suﬃciently in sequential R&D which
prevents rivals from making the acquisition unproﬁtable by expanding their business. Synergies
necessary for a proﬁtable acquisition thus provide an explanation as to why acquiring MNEs
invest more intensely in aﬃliate R&D than greenﬁeld entrants.
The theory also shows that there is a tendency to ”cherry-picking acquisitions”, i.e. foreign
acquisitions of domestic assets of high initial quality. These can be explained as follows: the value
for an MNE of obtaining the domestic ﬁrm consists of the proﬁt of the MNE as an acquirer net
the proﬁt of the MNE as a non-acquirer, whereas the reservation price of the domestic ﬁrm is the
ﬁrm’s product market proﬁt when keeping its assets. When the initial quality of the R&D assets
increases, the MNE’s proﬁt as the possessor will increase in parity with the proﬁt for the domestic
8Data is collected by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics in Stockholm.
3target ﬁrm as the possessor. But, since the MNE’s proﬁt as a non-acquirer also decreases due to
stronger competition with the domestic ﬁrm (or an alternative acquirer), the MNE’s valuation
will increase more than the reservation price of the domestic ﬁrm. Sequential R&D investments
driven by an eﬃciency-enhancing cherry-picking foreign acquisition thus provide an additional
mechanism to account for the observation that acquiring MNEs invest more intensively in aﬃliate
R&D than greenﬁeld entrants. However, it is also shown that such ”cherry-picking” foreign
acquisitions will predominantly occur when the acquiring MNE is suﬃciently eﬃcient in using
high-quality assets, once more due to the merger proﬁtability requirement.
We now turn to explaining why the R&D gap in favor of acquired aﬃliates has been reduced
over time. There has been a substantial decrease in the transaction costs of cross-border M&As
since the 1980s due to the deregulation of restrictions on foreign ownership around the world.
Then, we show that a reduction in the transaction costs of cross-border M&As does not only
increase the incentives to undertake cross-border M&As, but also that cross-border M&As in-
volving a lower level of sequential R&D investments are more likely to occur. The reason is
that less eﬃcient MNEs investing less in sequential R&D can then aﬀord to take over domestic
ﬁrms in foreign countries. Our model thus provides an insight into why the R&D gap in favor of
acquired aﬃliates was larger in the 1970’s than in the 1990’s while there was a dramatic increase
in the number of cross-border M&As: decreased transaction costs may have induced more but
less eﬃcient cross-border M&As.
Having developed a theory which is consistent with the empirical facts, we use the theory to
evaluate the welfare eﬀects of blocking cross-border M&As. Then, we use a parametric version of
our theoretical model, referred to as the Linear-Quadratic-Cournot (LQC) Model. We show that
blocking foreign acquisition is welfare improving if and only if the combination of synergies and
initial quality is suﬃciently low. However, the analysis also presents several arguments against
interventionist policies. First, a large part of potentially welfare reducing foreign acquisitions are
blocked by market forces, i.e. they are not proﬁtable when allowed. Second, and contrary to the
above policy concern, the expected welfare gain of restricting cross-border M&As is not higher
for targets endowed with a high initial quality (i.e the so-called ”cherries” or national champi-
ons). While a market-power driven acquisition of domestic targets of high quality can emerge
in equilibrium, the potential welfare beneﬁt of cross-border M&As with high complementarities
is also higher when the target ﬁrm’s assets are of higher quality. The welfare cost of blocking a
4foreign acquisition of a national champion can therefore be substantial.
Our study is related to the recent literature on international M&As in oligopolistic markets
which, in contrast to the traditional FDI literature, emphasizes that greenﬁeld investments and
cross-border acquisitions are not perfect substitutes as entry modes of FDI.9 Nevertheless, this
literature typically treats the greenﬁeld investment alternative as cursory. In this context, we
extend the model developed by Norbäck and Persson (2008) by explicitly modeling R&D invest-
ments and allowing the quality of the R&D assets of the domestic ﬁrm to vary. This enables us
to analyze when cherry-picking acquisitions may take place and how cross-border M&As could
aﬀect future R&D investments in the host country.
Our study is also related to the literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity and entry modes in foreign
markets,10 in particular to Nocke and Yeaple (2007, 2008). They study how diﬀerences in ﬁrm
productivity inﬂuence the greenﬁeld versus acquisition choice of MNEs according to the nature of
assets, i.e. their degree of international mobility. Our model, based on an acquisition-investment-
oligopoly framework, examines how the entry mode of FDI depends on international ownership
eﬃciency diﬀerences and asset complementarities and how cross-border M&As inﬂuence future
R&D investments in both acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates. In particular, we show that MNE
heterogeneity can stem from cross-border M&As creating MNEs with unique assets. These
diﬀerences between MNEs can be further excaberated by sequential R&D investment driven by
strategic oligopolistic eﬀects.
Focusing on sequential R&D investments, our study ﬁnally makes a contribution to the
empirical literature which has so far mainly focused on the determinants of entry mode, and not
on the eﬀects on sequential investments.11 To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is
Belderbos (2003) in the business literature who in a cross-section of manufacturing aﬃliates of
Japanese ﬁrms ﬁnds that the R&D intensity of acquired aﬃliates substantially exceeds that of
wholly-owned greenﬁeld aﬃliates. In this paper, we go further by examining how the entry mode
9See, for instance, Blonigen (1997), Bjorvatn (2004), Bertrand and Zitouna (2005), Head and Ries (2006),
Mattoo et al. (2004), Norbäck and Persson (2008) or Raﬀ et al. (2005). There is also a small theoretical literature
addressing welfare aspects of cross-border mergers in international oligopoly markets. This literature includes
papers by, for example, Falvey (1998), Head and Ries (1997), Horn and Persson (2001), Lommerud, Straume and
Sorgard (2004), Neary (2007) and Norbäck and Persson (2007).
10See, for instance, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004).
11Nocke and Yeaple (2008) and Raﬀ et al. (2005) ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrm characteristics aﬀect the choice of
entry mode, thus conﬁrming that cross-border acquisition and greenﬁeld entry are not perfect substitutes.
5aﬀects both the decision to conduct R&D and the level of R&D expenditures over a long period
of time and in a very large number of host countries.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents evidence of R&D and entry modes of FDI.
Section 3 presents the theoretical model and analysis. In section 4, we show how the theory
could be used to explain the presented evidence. In Section 5, our theoretical model is used to
undertake a welfare evaluation of a restrictive cross-border M&A policy. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Entry mode and R&D: Empirical evidence
To obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between the entry mode of FDI and R&D invest-
ments, we use unique data on acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates of Swedish multinational ﬁrms
from the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN). The data is based on a questionnaire
sent to all Swedish MNEs every fourth year, on average, since 1970. Data on R&D expenditures
for aﬃliates is available for ﬁve surveys: 1970, 1978, 1990, 1994 and 1998. Our sample repre-
sents an unbalanced panel including information on almost all Swedish multinational ﬁrms in
the manufacturing sector and their producing majority-owned aﬃliates abroad. A more detailed
description of the data can be found in the Appendix.
This database oﬀers two main advantages. First, it makes it possible for us to identify these
two main entry modes over a long period of time (from 1970 to 1998) and in a large number of
developed and developing countries. Second, detailed information about parent and aﬃliate ﬁrm
characteristics makes it possible to control for other factors with an impact on the innovative
global strategies of MNEs. In the appendix we give a more detailed description of the data.
Table A1 indicates the number of aﬃliates by entry mode, year, sector and region in the world.
The limitations of the data set are that we do not have any information on the acquired ﬁrms
prior to the acquisition. On the other hand, our data has the advantage of providing valuable
i n f o r m a t i o no nt h ee ﬀects of foreign acquisitions due to the availability of an alternative control
group of aﬃliates created by greenﬁeld entry. The theory presented in the next section will show
the merits of this comparison.
62.1. Raw diﬀerences
Figure 2.1 (i) plots the number of aﬃliates established by greenﬁeld investments and mergers
and acquisitions, respectively. As can be seen, aﬃliates established through greenﬁeld entry were
more common in the 1970’s, whereas this was reversed in the 1990’s. This is consistent with the
empirical trend towards an increasing importance of cross-border M&As. It suggests that the
investment liberalization and the integration of international capital markets in the 1990’s have
had a more pronounced impact on acquisitions than on greenﬁeld investments. Figures 2.1
(ii) and (iii) plot the total share of acquired aﬃliates by sectors and regions. M&As are very
important as an entry mode in developed countries, but their role has grown most signiﬁcantly
in developing countries. The rise in the share of M&As in science-based industries constitutes a
large part of the overall increase in M&As since the mid 1990’s.12
Let us now investigate if there are any systematic diﬀerences in R&D activities between
acquired aﬃliates and aﬃliates created by greenﬁeld investments. As a measure of R&D activity,
we use R&D intensity deﬁned as the share of R&D expenditures in total sales. Thus, we normalize
R&D expenditures with total sales to control for size eﬀects. Figure2.2 (i) indicates that, on
average, acquired aﬃliates have a higher R&D intensity than greenﬁeld aﬃliates.
We then state our ﬁrst observation:
Observation 1: Acquired aﬃliates have, on average, a higher level of R&D intensity than aﬃl-
iates created by greenﬁeld investments.
Let us now investigate whether the probability of undertaking R&D diﬀers between acquired
and greenﬁeld aﬃliates. Indeed, R&D is not conducted at all in about half the Swedish aﬃliates.
Figure 2.2 (ii) shows that acquired aﬃliates are more likely to conduct R&D and Figure 2.2 (ii)
emphasizes that the diﬀerence remains over time. These diﬀerences suggest that in cross-border
M&As, MNEs obtain R&D capabilities, or R&D assets, which are continuously used after an
acquisition.
We can then state our second observation:
12We may also note that there has been a decreasing trend in the number of aﬃliates in the 1990s. This may
be explained by the fact that some large Swedish MNEs were acquired or merged with foreign ﬁrms during the
1990s and are no longer in the data base. Nevertheless, FDI from Swedish MNEs increased in terms of employees
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Figure 2.1: Mode of entry over time, industries and regions.
8Observation 2: Acquired aﬃliates are, on average, more likely to conduct R&D than aﬃliates
created by greenﬁeld investments.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, there has been a signiﬁcant increase in the number of cross-border
acquisitions since the 1970’s. This may be a consequence of investment liberalization which has
reduced the transaction costs of foreign acquisitions. Despite this, it seems that the R&D gap
between acquired aﬃliates and aﬃliates created by greenﬁeld entry has diminished over time.
This pattern can be seen in Figure 2.2 (i) and, in particular, in Figure 2.2 (iii) which compares
R&D intensities of the aﬃliates to non-zero R&D expenditures.
We can then state our third observation:
Observation 3: While cross-border M&As start to dominate as the entry mode in the 1990’s,
the gap between R&D intensity in acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates was larger in the 1970’s
than in the 1990’s.
However, these observations might just suggest that acquired aﬃliates can beneﬁtf r o me x -
isting R&D capabilities while greenﬁeld aﬃliates starting from scratch need time to build up
their own capacities. In Figure 2.3 (i), we therefore plot average R&D intensity as a function
of the number of years an aﬃliate has been part of the MNE, which we denote as the aﬃliate
age.13 Figure 2.3 (i) then shows that the gap in favor of acquired aﬃliates persists over age. In
Figures 2.3 (i) and (ii), we also relate the R&D intensity of an aﬃliate to the R&D intensity in
the three-digit industry in their respective host countries. As expected, average R&D intensity
in Swedish aﬃliates is higher than the industry average. While aﬃliate R&D intensity seems to
decline somewhat at a young age, this decline is stronger for aﬃliates established by greenﬁeld
entry.
In sum, observations 1 to 3 suggest that there are diﬀerences in the R&D activities of aﬃliates
created by acquisition and greenﬁeld entry. We now examine if these diﬀerences persist when
explicitly controling for ﬁrm, industry and host country characteristics.
2.2. Conditional diﬀerences
We will now further examine the sources of the R&D gap in a simple econometric analysis. As
previously noted, a majority of aﬃliates have zero R&D expenditures. To avoid estimates to
13We plot three-year averages of age since there may be too few observations and too much variation per each
year of age.
91970 1978 1990 1994 1998
1970 1978 1990 1994 1998







































(ii)  Shareof 
affiliates doing
R&D (%)






























0-2 3-5 6-8 9-11 12-15
(i)  Average R&D 
intensity (%)
(All observations)
(ii)  Average R&D 













Figure 2.3: Aﬃliate R&D activities by entry mode over the age of an aﬃliate.
11be both biased and inconsistent, we apply the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to analyze the
eﬀect of the entry mode on aﬃliate R&D activity:14
DRDit = α0 + α1MA_GIi + α0
2Zit + α0
3Zjt + uijt (2.1)
log(RDit)=β0 + β1MA_GIi + β0
2Xit + β0
3Xjt + γit + εijt, (2.2)
where DRDit =1if RDit > 0, RDit =0otherwise. MA_GIi indicates whether an aﬃliate was
acquired (MA_GIi =1 ) or created from a greenﬁeld investment (MA_GIi =0 ). Zi is a vector
of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables and Zj is a vector of variables aﬀecting the decision to conduct
R&D. Xit and Xjt are the corresponding ﬁrm- and host country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sa ﬀecting the
R&D intensity, uij and εijt are the usual error terms, and γijt =
φ(α0Z)
Φ(α0Z) is the error correction
variable, where φ(.) and Φ(.) are the normal density and cumulative distributions, respectively.
The aﬃliate, parent and country level control variables are variables suggested in the literature
and described in detail in the appendix where we also provide summary statistics.
The results from estimating (2.1) and (2.2) are shown in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2)
indicate the estimation results for the ﬁrst and second stages of the Heckman two-stage proce-
dure. The results for the ﬁrst-stage probit in column (1) show that acquired aﬃliates are more
often associated with R&D activities, independent of aﬃliate age, size and other characteristics.
Furthermore, the positive and signiﬁcant dummy variable MA_GI in the second stage of the
Heckman estimation suggests that acquired ﬁrms have a higher R&D intensity than greenﬁeld
aﬃliates, after taking into account unobserved characteristics aﬀecting the selection process.15
[Table 1 here]
The economic importance of the estimates is large. The marginal eﬀect of the entry mode
dummy MA_GI in equation (2.1) is 0.14. Thus, when comparing two aﬃliates with otherwise
similar characteristics, except the entry mode, an acquired aﬃliate is 12 percent more likely to
perform R&D as compared to an aﬃliate created by greenﬁeld entry. The corresponding eﬀect of
the entry mode dummy in equation (2.2) implies that the R&D intensity is, on average, about 46
14We choose not to use a Tobit approach since zero R&D expenditure is likely to be a consequence of binary
decision-making rather than censoring, as assumed in a Tobit model. We also estimated Tobit regressions. The
results were qualitatively similar and are therefore not reported.
15This result is consistent with Belderbos (2003). In his paper, acquired aﬃliates of Japanese MNEs are shown
to have a higher R&D intensity than greenﬁeld aﬃliates in Tobit estimations. The Tobit method gives qualitatively
the same results for our sample.
12percent higher in acquired aﬃliates.16 These estimated eﬀects are similar to the unconditional
diﬀerences observed in Figures 2.2 (ii) and (iii).
We then turn to the impact of aﬃliate age by estimating the eﬀect for aﬃliates aged less
than nine years and those aged between nine and twenty years. Columns (3) to (6) in Table
1 show the results for Heckman estimations. It appears that in both sub-samples, acquired
aﬃliates are more likely to conduct R&D and have a higher level of R&D than greenﬁeld ones
which is consistent with Figure 2.2. The coeﬃcient diﬀerences indicate that the likelihood of
having R&D is larger for the younger acquired aﬃliates than for the older ones, but the level
of R&D is higher among the older acquired aﬃliates. These regression outcomes suggest that
the start-up delay in the R&D activities of greenﬁeld aﬃliates does not explain the gap in favor
of acquired aﬃliates. Greenﬁeld aﬃliates do not seem to catch up with the acquired ones over
time. Moreover, acquired aﬃliates do not seem to reduce their R&D over time, at least not to a
higher degree than greenﬁeld aﬃliates, which is consistent with Figure 2.3.
Finally, we split the data into the 1970’s and 1990’s samples and run separate regressions for
these samples. Table 2 shows the entry mode dummy to still be signiﬁcant and positive, thus
suggesting that acquired aﬃliates are more likely to conduct R&D and have a higher level of
R&D during both sub periods. We also ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient size of the MA_GI dummy is
signiﬁcantly higher in the 1970’s than in the 1990’s, suggesting that the gap was larger in the
1970’s, with the second-stage estimates also being signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
[Table 2 here]
Summing up, examining conditional diﬀerences, we ﬁnd that observations 1 to 3 still hold:
Aﬃliates created as acquisitions invest more intensively in R&D than aﬃliates created through
greenﬁeld entry, and they are more likely to conduct R&D. Moreover, these diﬀerences in R&D
behavior have decreased in the 1990’s.
We now present a theory of entry mode of FDI and aﬃliate R&D which can provide expla-
nations for these observations and can be used for welfare evaluations of blocking cross-border
M&As.
16T h ee s t i m a t eo fβ1 in equation (2.2) is ˆ β1 =0 .376. From (2.2), it follows that
g RDMA− g RDGI
g RDGI = e
ˆ β1−1=0 .4564.
133. Theory
Consider a country H, where the market has previously been served by a single domestic ﬁrm,
denoted d.T h i sl o c a lﬁrm possesses domestic R&D assets, denoted k0. The market will now be
exposed to international investments from M symmetric MNEs.17 The interaction then takes
place in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the MNEs might acquire the R&D assets of the domestic
ﬁrm. In the second stage, all ﬁrms may invest in new R&D assets in country H. Finally, in the
third stage, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly fashion in country H. The following sections describe the
product market interaction, the R&D investment game and the acquisition game.
3.1. Period 3: product market interaction
The ﬁrm proﬁts will depend on the distribution of the R&D asset ownership, given from the
investment game in period 2, and the acquisition game in period 1. To capture this, we will work
with the following notation: let the set of ﬁrms in the industry be I = {d,1,2,...,M}, and let the
s e to f( p o t e n t i a l )o w n e r so ft h ed o m e s t i ca s s e t s ,k0,b eL = {d,1,2,...,M}.T h ea s s e to w n e r s h i p
structure K =( kd,k m1,...,kmM) speciﬁes the asset ownership of each ﬁrm. The ﬁrst entry refers
to assets holdings of the domestic ﬁrm, the second to assets holdings of the ﬁrst MNE, the third
to assets holdings of the second MNE, etc.
Let πi(x,κ,l)=Ri(x,κ,l)− ¯ Fi−Fi(κi) denote the proﬁto fﬁrm i ∈ I,w h e r ex =( xd,x m1,...,xmM)
is the vector of actions taken by ﬁrms in the product market interaction in period 3, κ =
(κd,κ m1,...,κmM) represents the vector of investments in new R&D assets in period 2, and l ∈ L
denotes the ownership of the domestic assets resulting from the acquisition game in period 1.
Ri(x,κ,l) i st h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁti np e r i o d3 , ¯ Fi is a ﬁxed cost of investment in period 2
and Fi(κi) is the variable cost of investment in new R&D assets κi in period 2.
W ea r en o ws e tt od e s c r i b eo p t i m a lﬁrm behavior in the product market. Given the invest-
m e n t si np e r i o d2 ,κ, and the ownership of the domestic assets resulting from period 1, l, ﬁrm
i chooses an action xi ∈ R+ to maximize its product market proﬁt, Ri(xi,x −i,κ,l),w h e r ex−i
is the set of actions taken by i’s rivals. We may consider the action xi as setting a quantity
à la Cournot, or a price à la Bertrand. In either case, we assume the existence of a unique
17 There could be diﬀerent reasons for why the market is now open to international investments. The
country might be investment liberalizing, the international expansion of MNEs might be a natural step in
the life product cycle or stem from increasing local demand and the transaction costs of foreign investments
may have been reduced in the globalization process.
14Nash-Equilibrium, x∗ (κ,l),d e ﬁned as:
Ri(x∗
i,x ∗
−i,κ,l) ≥ Ri(xi,x ∗
−i,κ,l), ∀xi ∈ R+. (3.1)
From (3.1), we can deﬁne a reduced-form net proﬁtf o raﬁrm i, taking as given ownership l of the
domestic assets k0 and the vector of new investments κ,a sπi (κ,l)− ¯ Fi ≡ Ri(x∗
i (κ,l),x ∗
−i (κ,l),κ,l)−
Fi(κi) − ¯ Fi.
3.2. Period 2: Endogenous R&D investments
In period 2, ﬁrm i invests in new R&D assets κi, given the ownership l of the domestic assets, k0,
determined in the acquisition game in period 1. We make the following standard assumptions: the
reduced-form proﬁt πi (κ,l) decreases in the number of ﬁrms in the market and rivals’ investments
κ−i. It is also supposed to be strictly concave in its own investments κi and rise in κi for some
κi.
Formally, ﬁrm i makes its choice κi ∈ R+ to maximize the reduced-form proﬁt, πi (κ,l) which
we rewrite as πi (κi,κ−i,l),w h e r eκ−i denotes investments in new R&D assets by i’s rivals. We












, ∀κi ∈ R+. (3.2)
This allows us to deﬁne πi(l) ≡ πi(κ∗ (l),l) ≡ πh(x∗(κ∗ (l)),κ ∗ (l),l) as a reduced-form proﬁt
function for ﬁrm i under ownership l of assets k0, encompassing the ﬁrms’ optimal actions in
period 3, x∗, and optimal R&D investments in new assets in period 2, κ∗.
The assumption that MNEs 1,2,...,M are symmetric before the acquisition occurs thus im-
plies that we need only distinguish between two kinds of ownership, domestic ownership (l = d)
and foreign (MNE) ownership (l = m). There are two types of asset ownership structures, K(m)
and K(d):
K(m)=( 0 ,k 0(α,γ)+κ∗
A,κ ∗
G,...,κ ∗
G | {z }
M−1
),α , γ > 0 (3.3)
K(d)=( k0(α,1) + κ∗
d,κ ∗
G,...,κ ∗
G | {z }
M
),α > 0, (3.4)
where we keep track of three types of ﬁrms, h = {d,A,G}, i.e. the domestic ﬁrm (d), an acquiring
MNE (A), and greenﬁeld entrants (G). The ﬁrst entry in K(l) shows the asset ownership of the
domestic ﬁrm, d, the second entry indicates the asset ownership of the potentially acquiring MNE
15(MNE 1), and the remaining entries refer to the asset ownership of the symmetric non-acquiring
MNEs, i.e. greenﬁeld entrants. Under MNE ownership of the domestic assets, k0,t h e r ei so n e
acquiring MNE and M −1 non-acquiring MNEs investing greenﬁeld. Under domestic ownership,
there are M MNEs investing greenﬁeld.
The eﬀective quality of the domestic R&D assets k0 will typically vary and a change from
domestic to foreign ownership might induce a diﬀerent use of them. To capture this, we make
use of the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. (i) Let α>0 denote the initial quality of the R&D assets and let γ>0 be a
measure of the complementarity between acquired domestic R&D assets and MNEs’ ﬁrm-speciﬁc
assets. (ii) The eﬀective quality of the domestic R&D assets is then k0(m)=k0(α,γ) under
foreign ownership and k0(d)=k0(α,1) under domestic ownership. (iii) k0
0,α > 0, k0




MNEs are typically leading ﬁrms in their respective industries and possess ﬁrm-speciﬁck n o w l -
edge in terms of technology or organizational and marketing know-how, for instance.18 Some of
this knowledge may be transferred under a change of ownership. This would result in a more
productive use of the initial R&D assets, k0. Then, γ>1 and k0(m) >k 0(d). However, when-
ever γ<1, an MNE is less eﬃcient when using the R&D assets and the eﬀective quality of the
domestic R&D assets is lower under foreign ownership, k0(m) <k 0(d).19
To proceed, we then make the following assumption on how reduced-form proﬁts and sequen-





dk0 > 0 and
dπG(l)










Assumption A1(i) implies that an increase in the eﬀective quality of R&D assets k0 will
increase the possessor’s proﬁt while reducing the proﬁt of its rivals. The increase in the possessor’s
proﬁt may occur through direct eﬀects, but also indirectly by aﬀecting the optimal actions by
rivals in the stage-three product market game (x∗), and through ﬁrms’ investments in new R&D
assets (κ∗). In particular, Assumption A1(ii) implies that an acquiring ﬁrm that possesses a
18See Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2006), Markusen (2002), Markusen (1995) and Caves (1995).
19In addition to distinct corporate cultures, cultural and geographical distance may prevent technology transfer
by making communication as well as the assimilation and application of new knowledge more diﬃcult.
16higher eﬀective quality of the initial R&D assets will invest more aggressively in new R&D assets.
This will then make the rivals less aggressive in their investment behavior, thereby reducing the
proﬁts of these competing ﬁrms.
Example 1 (The LQC-model). As an example of a model where Assumption A1 is fulﬁlled,
we extend Neary (2002) into a framework with FDI through greenﬁeld entry and cross-border
acquisitions. This Linear-Quadratic Cournot model (LQC-model) is also used to derive more
speciﬁc results. The oligopoly interaction in period 3 is Cournot competition in homogenous
goods. Investments in new R&D assets in period 2 reduce ﬁrm marginal costs. The proﬁtf o r





− ¯ Fi, (3.5)
where Ri =( P −ci)qi i st h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁta n dw h e r ew ea s s u m ec o s t st ob eq u a d r a t i ci n
new assets, κi, Fi(κi)=
μκ2
i
2 .F i r m sf a c et h ei n v e r s ed e m a n dP = a− 1
s
PN
i=1 qi,w h e r ea>0 is a
demand parameter, s may be interpreted as the size of the market, and N is the total number of
ﬁrms in the market. Investments in new capital reduce a ﬁrm’s marginal cost in a linear fashion
ci =¯ ci − θκi, where θ is a positive constant parameter measuring how eﬀectively investments
in new capital κi in stage 2 reduce the marginal cost. For simplicity, we assume that all ﬁrms
share the same investment technology, θ and μ. Asymmetries between ﬁrms are captured by the
intercept term, ¯ ci, which assesses the impact on ﬁrm i’s absolute eﬃciency level of the possession
of all other assets prior to investment in new R&D assets, κi, in stage 2. Making a distinction
between ﬁrm types, we have:
¯ cG = c, ¯ cA = c +˜ cA − γα, ¯ cd = c +˜ cd − α, (3.6)
w h e r ew en o t et h a tk0(m)=γα and k0(d)=α and that k0(m) and k0(d) are consistent with
Deﬁnition 1. Hence, existing assets k0 and new assets κi are assumed to be imperfect substitutes.
We capture cost asymmetries between MNEs and the domestic ﬁrm by including ˜ cd ≥ 0 in the
domestic ﬁrm’s intercept term, ¯ cd.T h et e r m˜ cA captures that diﬀerent factors may also lead to
higher marginal costs when making an acquisition as compared to greenﬁeld investments. From
(3.1), we get ∂Ri
















N(l)+1,w h e r eN(m)=M and N(d)=M +1 . Solving for stage 2 investments
κ∗(l) and stage 3 sales q∗(l),w eh a v et h er e d u c e d - f o r mp r o ﬁts πi(l). It can be shown that these











− ¯ Fi,w h e r eη = sθ2
μ . The expressions
for reduced-form proﬁts are given in the Appendix in Table A.1, where it can be checked that
reduced form proﬁts πi(l) and R&D choices κ∗
i(l) fulﬁll Assumption A1.
3.3. Period 1: the acquisition game
The acquisition process is depicted as an auction game where M MNEs simultaneously post
bids and the domestic ﬁrm then either accepts or rejects these bids. Each MNE announces a
bid (denoted bi) for the domestic ﬁrm. b =( b1,...,b i,...,b M) ∈ RM is the vector of these bids.
Following the announcement of b, the domestic ﬁr mm a yb es o l dt oo n eo ft h eM N E sa tt h eb i d
price, or remain in the ownership of ﬁrm d. If more than one bid is accepted, the bidder with
the highest bid obtains the domestic assets. If there is more than one MNE with such a bid,
these MNEs obtain the assets with equal probability. This winning bid is then referred to as the
acquisition price S. The acquisition is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies.
There is supposed to exist a smallest amount ε such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is
added or subtracted.
We now turn to the ﬁrms’ valuations of the domestic ﬁrm’s R&D assets, k0. There are three
diﬀerent valuations which need to be considered. We start with the valuations of MNEs:
• vmm is the preemptive valuation, i.e. the value for an MNE of obtaining k0,w h e narival
MNE would otherwise obtain k0.T h eﬁr s tt e r ms h o w st h ep r o ﬁt when possessing k0.T h e
second term shows the expected proﬁti far i v a lM N Eo b t a i n sk0,i nw h i c hc a s et h eM N E
invests greenﬁeld:
vmm = πA(m) − ¯ FA −
£
πG(m) − ¯ FG
¤
. (3.7)
• vmd is the takeover valuation, i.e. the value for an MNE of obtaining k0, when the domestic
ﬁrm would otherwise keep them. The proﬁt for an MNE of not obtaining assets k0 is
diﬀerent in this case, due to the change of identity of the ﬁrm which would otherwise get
the assets:
vmd = πA(m) − ¯ FA −
£
πG(d) − ¯ FG
¤
. (3.8)
• vd is the reservation price,i . e .t h ev a l u ef o rt h ed o m e s t i cﬁrm of keeping k0. By assumption,
πd(m)=0and thus:
vd = πd(d). (3.9)
18We have the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. The equilibrium ownership structure (EOS) and the acquisition price S∗ are de-
s c r i b e di nT a b l e3 . 1 .
Since MNEs are symmetric, valuations vmm,v md and vd can be ordered in six diﬀerent ways
and the EOS is solved for each inequality I1-I6 in table 3.1. Three types of ownership structures
arise in equilibrium: the one where ﬁrm d keeps its assets k0 is thus K(d) arising under I5 or I6;
the one where k0 is obtained by one of the MNEs corresponds to K(m), where the acquisition
price is S∗ = vmm under inequalities I1, I2 or I3,a n dS = vd under inequality I4.W h e n I2
holds, there exist multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, ﬁrm d keeps the assets and no MNE
posts a bid above vd. There is also an equilibrium where one of the MNEs obtains these assets
at a price vmm − ε and another MNE posts the second highest bid at vmm − 2ε.
Table 3.1: The equilibrium ownership structure (EOS) and acquisition price.
Inequality: Deﬁnition: EOS: Acquisition price S*:
I1: vmm >v md >v d K(m) vmm
I2: vmm >v d >v md K(m) or K(d) vmm under K(m)
I3: vmd >v mm >v d K(m) vmm
I4: vmd >v d >v mm K(m) vd
I5: vd >v mm >v md K(d) .
I6: vd >v md >v mm K(d) .
For proof, see Norbäck and Persson (2007).
4. Reconciling theory and empirical evidence
4.1. Why do MNEs invest more in R&D in acquired aﬃliates?
Let us ﬁrst explain why MNEs invest more in R&D in acquired aﬃliates (observations 1 and 2
in Section 2). To this end, we study how the incentives for cross-border acquisitions depend on
the asset complementarity γ. From equations (3.7) and (3.9) and Deﬁnition 1, it follows that
19the valuations of MNEs vmd and vmm increase monotonously in the complementarity γ,w h e r e a s
the reservation price vd is independent of γ. Thus, we can state the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. There exists a unique γT deﬁned from vmd(γT,·)=vd and a unique γP deﬁned from
vmm(γP,·)=vd.
To explain and illustrate our results, we will make use of the following assumption which, for
instance, holds in the LQC model.
Assumption A2 γP >γ T > 0.
Assumption A2 allows us to derive a simple graphical solution where all types of relevant
equilibria are present. In Figures 4.1 (i) and 4.1 (ii), we derive the equilibrium ownership structure
(EOS) for which the size of the foreign R&D eﬃciency γ varies. In Figure 4.1 (iii), we explore the
eﬀect of endogenous investments as a function of eﬃciency eﬀects associated with an ownership
change in Deﬁnition 1. Let us start with Figure 4.1 (i). When complementarities are low
γ ∈ (0,γT),t h ef o r e i g nﬁrm’s takeover valuation is lower than the domestic ﬁrm’s reservation
price. This is illustrated in Figure 4.1 (i) where the vd curve is above the vmd curve. In this case,
the combined proﬁt of the acquiring foreign ﬁrm and the domestic target ﬁrm is lower than their
stand-alone proﬁts. Thus, without suﬃcient synergies, the associated increase in concentration
is not suﬃcient to make an acquisition proﬁtable.
From Deﬁnition 1, the takeover valuation, vmd = πA(m) − πd(d) − ( ¯ FA − ¯ FG),i n c r e a s e si n
complementarities, γ. Indeed, the proﬁta sa na c q u i r e rπA(m) increases in γ since the eﬀective
quality of the domestic R&D assets goes up k0
0,γ(α,γ) > 0, whereas the domestic ﬁrm’s valu-









0,γ(α,γ) > 0. (4.1)
A further increase in complementarities γ will thus make a takeover acquisition strictly prof-
itable as vmd >v d. The equilibrium sales price is then S∗ = vd = πd(d). This is illustrated at
point T in Figure 4.1 (i), where takeover acquisitions occur in the region γ ∈ [γT,γP).
Finally, turn to the case of high levels of complementarities γ ∈ (γP,γmax).U s i n gD e ﬁnition
1, we can note that the preemptive valuation of foreign ﬁrms vmm will increase more than
the takeover valuation vmd since increasing complementarities do not only increase the product
20market proﬁt as an acquirer but also decrease the product market proﬁt as a non-acquirer. Thus,
t h ep r e e m p t i v ev a l u a t i o nvmm is not only driven by the beneﬁts of obtaining a strong position
in the product market as an acquirer, but also by the preemptive motive for avoiding a weak












0,γ(α,γ) > 0. (4.2)
It then follows that a further increase in complementarities into the region γ ∈ (γP,γmax) will
make a preemptive acquisition strictly proﬁtable as vmm >v d. Fierce bidding competition among
foreign ﬁrms then drives the equilibrium sales price to S∗ = vmm = πA(m)−πG(m)−( ¯ FA− ¯ FG).
This is illustrated by point P in Figure 4.1 (i).
Therefore, we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. (i) No acquisition will take place if the complementarities between MNEs’ ﬁrm-
speciﬁc assets and the domestic assets are low, γ ∈ (0,γT), (ii) a foreign takeover-acquisition
will take place with S∗ = vd if the complementarities are intermediate, γ ∈ [γT,γP),a n d( i i i )a
foreign preemptive-acquisition will take place with S∗ = vmm if the complementarities are high,
γ ≥ γP.
We can now address the impact of ownership on ﬁrms’ R&D investment. As will be shown
below using the LQC model, while the market power eﬀect may lead to ineﬃcient acquisitions
where γ<1, the proﬁtability constraint vmd ≥ vd will imply that synergies γ cannot be signiﬁ-
cantly below unity. Therefore, when a takeover acquisition occurs at γT, there is a tendency to
a discrete increase in R&D investments following a takeover, κ∗
A (m) >κ ∗
d (d). The increase in
concentration then enhances the incentives of the foreign owner to make R&D investments. This
is illustrated in Figure 4.1 (iii), where non-acquiring MNEs will also increase their investments,
κ∗
G (m) >κ ∗
G (d) due to the concentration eﬀect.
Then, from Assumption A1, we know that the investments by the acquirer will increase


















0,γ(α,γ) < 0. (4.3)
Under domestic ownership investments, κ∗
h (d) is unaﬀected by foreign eﬃciency, or com-
plementarities γ,b yD e ﬁnition 1. As illustrated in Figure 4.1(iii), this implies that when R&D
21investments are signiﬁcantly higher in acquired aﬃliates than in a domestic ﬁrm κ∗
A (m) >κ ∗
d (d),
R&D investments in the acquired aﬃliate will also tend to be signiﬁcantly higher than in an af-
ﬁliate created by greenﬁeld entry, κ∗
A (m) >κ ∗
G (l).
Thus, we show that for the acquisition to take place, a foreign owner must be suﬃciently
eﬃcient in utilizing acquired R&D assets. The value of parameter γ needs to be suﬃciently
large. In turn, an eﬃcient foreign acquirer will then invest aggressively in sequential R&D to
keep rivals from making the acquisition unproﬁtable by expanding their R&D. This tends to
make the expansion in R&D activities larger in acquired aﬃliates as compared to either aﬃliates
created through greenﬁeld entry or R&D under maintained domestic ownership of the target
ﬁrm. To summarize:
Proposition 2. For suﬃciently high levels of complementarities γ, R&D investments are higher
in the acquired aﬃliate than in the domestic ﬁrm κ∗
A (m) >κ ∗
d (d) a n di nag r e e n ﬁeld aﬃliate
κ∗
A (m) >κ ∗
G (l).
4.1.1. "Cherry-picking" and R&D investments
Synergies emerging from foreign acquisitions may explain why MNEs invest more in R&D in
acquired aﬃliates than in aﬃliates created by greenﬁeld entry (as illustrated by observations 1
and 2 in Section 2). Another alternative explanation, which is a concern among policy makers,
is that MNEs just ”cherry pick” target ﬁrms, i.e. acquire target ﬁrms with already existing high
quality R&D assets, without generating any signiﬁcant synergies. However, a priori, it is not
obvious that the sellers would like to sell their best ﬁrms.
To evaluate this argument, we deﬁne cherry-picking as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Suppose that the EOS is K(d) at some initial R&D quality of the domestic assets
α0. (i) Cherry-picking arises if, ceteris paribus, increasing the initial quality from α0 to α0 + ε,
where ε>0, induces a foreign acquisition and hence foreign ownership, K(m).( i i ) C h e r r y -
picking is ”destructive” if the acquisition (induced by higher initial quality) occurs for γ<1.
(iii) Cherry-picking is ”eﬃciency-enhancing” if the acquisition occurs for γ>1.
We can then derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3. (i) If and only if complementarities γ are suﬃciently large, cherry-picking for-























vmd  Am −Gd − F ̄ A − F ̄ G















No acquisition: Foreign acquisition:
Investments h Investments h
P 1
Figure 4.1: Solving for the equilibrium ownership structure (EOS) and equilibrium investments
in new R&D assets.
23Intuitively, the proposition states that the merger proﬁtability requirement, in general, tends
to select eﬃciency-enhancing foreign acquisitions. This, in turn, will be reﬂected in the ﬁrm’s
R&D behavior, thus generating the largest sequential R&D investments in acquired aﬃliates.
To prove Proposition 3, we ﬁrst deﬁne the initial quality αT(γ) as an implicit function of













0,γ(α,γ) > 0 from (4.1). Hence, the sign of (4.4) hinges on the sign
of the term
d(vmd−vd)
dα which is the change in the net gain of a takeover acquisition when there is
an increase in initial quality. From (3.8), (3.9) and Deﬁnition 1, the change in the net gain of a
















The sign of (4.5) will depend on the level of complementarities, γ. First, consider the case of
synergies, γ>1. Since k0
0,α(α,γ) >k 0
0,α(α,1) > 0 from Deﬁnition 1, the proﬁto ft h ea c q u i r i n g
MNE πA(m) tends to increase at least as much as the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm πd(d),w h i l e
the proﬁt of a non-acquiring greenﬁeld entrant πG(d) decreases. Taking the latter negative
externality into account, the MNEs’ valuation of the domestic assets vmd will increase more than
the domestic ﬁrm’s reservation price vd when the initial quality of the R&D assets α increases,
d(vmd−vd)
dα > 0.T h u s ,f o r γ>1, the takeover condition αT(γ) will be downward sloping in the
γ −α space, as shown in Figure 4.2 which is drawn using the LQC model. Hence, since a higher
initial quality of the domestic R&D assets α gives rise to foreign acquisitions for γ>1,w e n o t e
that eﬃciency-enhancing ”cherry picking” arises.
When γ<1, k0
0,α(α,γ) <k 0
0,α(α,1) holds which makes (4.5) more complicated to evaluate.
However, since an acquisition must be proﬁtable (vmd ≥ vd), we know that synergies γ need to
be suﬃciently large. In most cases
d(vmd−vd)
dα > 0 will therefore hold and αT(γ) will be downward
sloping also when γ is below unity. Consequently, ”destructive” cherry-picking may arise but, as
shown by the example from the LQC model in Figure 4.2, the market forces requiring proﬁtable
acquisitions will limit the occurrence of such acquisitions.
Figure 4.2 thus illustrates that ”eﬃciency-enhancing” acquisitions tend to arise, that is,































Figure 4.2: Illustrating Cherry-picking acquisitions in the LQC-model. Parameter values set at
M =5 , Λ = s =5 , η =0 .15, ˜ cA =˜ cd =0 .3, ˜ cG =0 , FG =2and FA = Fd =0 .
also by the eﬃcient use of these assets. Foreign acquisitions then tend to occur in the North-East
direction of Figure 4.2, which indicates that the eﬀective size of the domestic R&D assets k0 will,
in equilibrium, be larger under foreign ownership. This is illustrated by the gradients 5k0(α,1) =
[k0
0,α(α,1),0]0 and 5k0(α,γ)=[ k0
0,α(α,γ),k0
0,γ(α,γ)]0. Note that the gradient under foreign
ownership 5k0(α,γ) tends to be larger than the gradient under maintained domestic ownership
5k0(α,1).F r o mD e ﬁnition 1, the eﬀective quality k0 solely increases from the initial quality α
under domestic ownership whereas under foreign ownership, the eﬃcient quality increases both
due to initial quality α and synergies γ. This also implies that the R&D investments generated
from ownership of the R&D assets k0 will be the largest under foreign ownership: according to
Assumption A1, R&D investments by the acquiring MNE κ∗
A(m) and the domestic ﬁrm κ∗
d(d)
increase in the quality of the domestic assets k0, whereas the R&D investments of greenﬁeld
entrants κ∗
G(l) decrease in k0. This is also the case in Figure 4.2 which uses the LQC model.
Figure 4.3 further shows that the diﬀerence in R&D sequential investments between the acquiring
MNE and a greenﬁeld entrant, as well as the diﬀerence as compared to the domestic ﬁrm, is
increasing when MNEs make a more eﬃcient use of assets of higher quality. Consequently, we
25can state the following Corollary:
Corollary 1. In the LQC model, cherry-picking acquisition tends to be ”eﬃciency-enhancing”
and, therefore, R&D investments tend to be larger in acquired aﬃliates as compared to R&D
investments in greenﬁeld aﬃliates κ∗
A (m) >κ ∗
G (l),a sw e l la sc o m p a r e dt oR & Di n v e s t m e n t si n
the domestic ﬁrm (had this ﬁrm remained under domestic ownership) κ∗
A (m) >κ ∗
d (d).
Foreign acquisitions driven by the eﬃcient use of high-quality domestic assets can thus account
for the empirical evidence developed in Section 2. Acquired aﬃliates are found to invest more
in R&D than aﬃliates created by greenﬁeld entry. In the empirical analysis, we used R&D
intensities (observation 1) and propensities to conduct R&D (observation 2) to highlight this
pattern. Using the LQC model, it is straightforward, but tedious, to show that the eﬃcient





i (l) are higher in acquired aﬃliates, as well as why the propensities to conduct
R&D are higher in acquired aﬃliates.20
4.2. Why has the ”R&D gap” between acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates decreased?
While policy makers have, in general, welcomed inward greenﬁeld FDI, they have been much
more sceptical towards FDI taking the form of cross-border acquisitions. However, the attitude
was gradually becoming more positive until the very end of the twentieth century when a return
of protectionism could be observed in the policy debate. Large privatization and liberalization
programs started in the UK in the late 1970’s and spread around the world.21 In Sweden, ﬁrms
have faced lower costs of acquiring ﬁrms located in other EU countries since the implementation
of the single market program and the Swedish EU membership in the 1990’s. The development of
a well-functioning global capital market has also made cross-border acquisitions less complicated
20To examine the extensive margin of R&D, suppose that a share β of the ﬁxed costs Fi of the MNEs could be
reduced by choosing not to conduct R&D. Assuming this cost to be sunk for the domestic ﬁrm (as previously), it
follows from Deﬁnition 1 and Assumption A1 that acquired aﬃliates are more likely to conduct R&D due to the
possession of the R&D assets k0(α,γ) when initial quality and synergies are large, while greenﬁeld entry would
be less likely to set up an R&D center. Alternatively, if an acquisition of R&D assets simply reduces the ﬁxed
costs Fi of conducting R&D when pre-existing assets can be used, acquired aﬃliates would also be more likely to
conduct R&D.
21In Sweden, for instance, the restrictions on foreign acquisitions were rigorous in the 1970’s, but were basically
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Figure 4.3: Comparing R&D investments in the LQC-model. Parameter values set at M =5 ,
Λ = s =5 , η =0 .15, ˜ cA =˜ cd =0 .3, ˜ cG =0 , FG =2and FA = Fd =0 .
27and costly. Consequently, the transaction costs generated by cross-border operations are likely
to have decreased between the 1970’s and the 1990’s. This transaction cost reduction might
have been more substantial for international M&As than for greenﬁeld investments, which may
explain why M&As as an entry mode has overtaken greenﬁeld FDI in Figure 2.1.
To examine the eﬀects of a reduction in foreign takeover transaction costs, we diﬀerentiate












It follows that reduced transactions costs ¯ FA imply that smaller synergies, or complementarities,
are needed to make foreign acquisitions proﬁtable. This is shown in Figure 4.4 (i) where γT is
reduced to ˜ γT from a fall in ¯ FA to ˜ FA, thus increasing the takeover valuation from vmd to ˜ vmd.
In Figure 4.4 (ii), we display the eﬀect on equilibrium investments. Note that since marginal
acquisitions occur at lower synergies, the diﬀerence between investments in acquired aﬃliates
κ∗
A (m) and other investments κ∗
h (l) decreases. In particular, as displayed in Figure 4.4 (iii),
investments in greenﬁeld aﬃl i a t e sm a yb eh i g h e rt h a ni na c q u i r e da ﬃliates after a liberalization,
κ∗
A (m) <κ ∗
G (m) at synergies close to the marginal, ˜ γT.22
Consequently, we can state the following result:
Proposition 4. A reduction in foreign takeover transaction costs will (i) increase the incentives
for cross-border acquisitions and (ii) imply that cross-border acquisitions associated with lower
sequential R&D investment will take place in equilibrium.
This result is interesting in the light of the deregulation of foreign ownership around the world
since the 1980s. Our model may thus explain why we ﬁnd the R&D gap in favor of acquired
aﬃliates to be larger in the 1970’s than in the 1990’s; decreased transaction costs may have
induced a larger number of but less eﬃcient M&As (observation 3 in Section 2).
5. Welfare eﬀects of blocking foreign takeovers
Let us now turn to an evaluation of the welfare eﬀects of cross-border M&A. The conventional
welfare evaluation of M&As and market structures in an international oligopoly is typically made
22From (4.6), it also follows that smaller transaction costs will shift the takeover locus α
T(γ) in Figure 4.2
inwards. It implies that the eﬃcient size of the domestic R&D assets k0(α,γ) will be smaller under foreign
ownership, thus leading to a smaller diﬀerence in R&D investment in acquired and greenﬁeld aﬃliates.
28No acquisition: Foreign acquisition
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Figure 4.4: Illustrating the eﬀects of a reduction in foreign takeover transaction costs
29by comparing the sum of domestic consumer surplus and domestic proﬁts in diﬀerent market
structures.
Then, we compare a Non-discriminatory (ND) policy where both greenﬁe l de n t r ya n da c q u i -
sition entry are allowed to a Discriminatory (D) policy which prohibits cross-border acquisitions.
It follows that the ND-a n dD-policies only diﬀer when an MNE acquires the domestic assets
k0 under the ND-policy. Let PS(l) and CS(l) denote the producer and consumer surplus when
the ownership of k0 is l =( d,m) and let welfare under ownership l be W(l)=PS(l)+CS(l).
Deﬁning the diﬀerence in welfare WND−D = W(m) − W(d), and rearranging terms, we obtain:
WND−D =[ S∗ − vd]
| {z }
Sales premium
+[ CS(m) − CS(d)], (5.1)
if an acquisition occurs under the ND-policy. The ﬁrst term in (5.1) captures the diﬀerence in
producer surplus, i.e. the sales premium, and the second term captures the diﬀerence in consumer
surplus.
The welfare eﬀects of cross-border acquisitions will depend on how eﬃciently the domestic
assets are used, how sequential R&D investments are aﬀected and how market power is changed.
Due to the complexity of the eﬀects involved in the model presented above, it is not possible
to derive any unambiguous results on the total welfare eﬀect of blocking foreign acquisitions.










(1 + 2N(l)+N(l)2 − 2N(l)η)
> 0, (5.2)
where 1+2N(l)+N(l)2−2N(l)η>0 is required for a well-behaved equilibrium in the investment
game in stage two. Thus, total R&D assets K(l) are increasing in the eﬀective quality of the
R&D assets, i.e. the investments in R&D by the possessor of k0 increase more than the reduction
of R&D by rivals when there is an increase in quality. It can then be shown that total output
Q∗(l) increases in k0, consumer prices P∗(l) decrease in k0 and hence, that the consumer surplus
is increasing in eﬀective quality,
dCS(l)
dk0 > 0.
We can now illustrate the welfare eﬀects of cross-border acquisitions. Figure 5.1(i) gives the
Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS). When allowed under the ND-policy, foreign acquisi-
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Figure 5.1: Illustrating welfare eﬀects in the LQC model. Parameter values set at M =5 ,
Λ = s =5 , η =0 .15, ˜ cA =˜ cd =0 .3, ˜ cG =0 , FG =2and FA = Fd =0 .
31foreign acquisitions when synergies and initial quality increase. Figure 5.1(ii) then shows how
total R&D assets K(l) in the host economy are aﬀected by cross-border merger policy. As ex-
pected from (5.2), when foreign acquisitions occur for high synergies γ and initial quality α,
total R&D assets are higher under the ND-policy, K(m) >K (d). Total R&D assets may be
lower under foreign ownership when synergies are limited due to the concentration eﬀect of an
acquisition. Nevertheless, from the proﬁtability requirement of an acquisition vmd = vd,t h ea r e a
where K(m) <K (d) is limited, thus weakening the arguments in favor of blocking cross-border
mergers in order to prevent a reduction of domestic R&D activities.
In Figure 5.1(iii), we show the relationship between equilibrium cross-border acquisitions and
consumer surplus. For medium-high levels of complementarities and initial quality levels, cross-
border M&As can decrease the consumer surplus due to the concentration eﬀect, whereas at
high complementarities and initial qualities, consumers gain from allowing cross-border M&As.
Thus, the eﬀects of cross-border acquisitions on consumers display a mirror image of the eﬀects
on total R&D assets, K(l).
Finally, considering the total surplus, adding proﬁts and the acquisition price to the consumer
surplus, the region where non-discriminatory policy is preferred increases. This is illustrated in
Figure 5.1(iv). In a comparison with Figure 5.1(i), the sales premium vmm−vd is also increasing
in the north-east direction since MNEs enter into preemptive bidding over increasingly eﬃcient
R&D assets k0(α,γ).
We have derived these four types of pictures for a large set of diﬀerent parameter values
in the LQC model. The general emerging picture is that blocking foreign acquisition can be
welfare improving if and only if the combination of synergies γ and initial quality α is suﬃciently
low. However, this does not imply that an interventionist policy might increase welfare. First, a
large share of the potentially welfare-reducing foreign acquisitions are blocked by market forces,
i.e. they are not proﬁtable when allowed. Second, while blocking ”cherry picking” acquisitions
of high-qualitative targets predominantly driven by market power incentives can be warranted,
such policies can also backﬁre. As illustrated by Figure 5.2, the potential welfare beneﬁto f
cross-border M&As with high synergies is also higher when the target ﬁrm’s assets are of higher
quality. Thus, the welfare cost of blocking cross-border M&As can be very high when target



































Figure 5.2: Illustrating the high welfare cost of blocking cross-border M&As, WND−D, when
target ﬁrm’s assets are of high quality, α. Parameter values set at M =5 , Λ = s =5 , η =0 .15,
˜ cA =˜ cd =0 .3, ˜ cG =0 , FG =2and FA = Fd =0 .
33Proposition 5. In the Linear-Quadratic Cournot Model: (i) restricting cross-border acquisi-
tions will increase the domestic consumer surplus, the total surplus and total R&D assets in the
host country if and only if γ and α are suﬃciently low. (ii) a large share of the welfare reducing
foreign acquisitions are blocked by market forces, i.e. they are not proﬁtable when allowed. (iii)
the expected welfare gain of restricting cross-border acquisitions is not necessarily higher for
targets with high-quality R&D assets since the risk of blocking foreign acquisitions generating
large eﬃciency gains is then higher.
I nt h ec a s eo fa c q u i s i t i o n so fR & D - i n t e n s i v eﬁrms, the welfare eﬀects of cross-border acqui-
sitions could also depend on their eﬀects on other agents than capital owners and consumers in
the considered industry of the host country. For instance, R&D investment may increase the
demand for high skilled labor, i.e. jobs associated with high job satisfaction and wage premiums.
R&D investment may also create positive technological spillovers in the economy. Adding a term
β [K(m) − K(d)] to the welfare expression in (5.1), we then have:
WND−D =[ S∗ − vd]+CS(m) − CS(d)+β [K(m) − K(d)].
It then directly follows from Figure 5.1 that the Non-discriminatory policy would be preferable
in an even larger parameter range when evaluating aggregate R&D K(l) in excess and its eﬀect
on total surplus in the national economy.23
6. Conclusions
In the policy arena, inward foreign direct investments are believed to generate R&D investments
and spillovers and should therefore be encouraged. An exception is the foreign acquisition of
”R&D national champions”, which is feared to have negative eﬀects on future domestic R&D
activities. To examine the validity of this argument, we ﬁrst examine unique micro data on
R&D investments in aﬃliates of Swedish multinational ﬁrms in 34 countries during the period
1970-1998. To support a pro-greenﬁeld and anti-international M&As policy, greenﬁeld FDI
should be associated with larger sequential R&D investments than acquisition FDI in the data.
In contrast, we ﬁnd that acquired aﬃliates invest more in R&D than greenﬁeld aﬃliates. To
explain this pattern, we then construct an acquisition-investment-oligopoly model, where MNEs
ﬁrst choose their entry mode and then decide the level of their (sequential) R&D investments.
23In the LQC model, it is also straightforward to introduce explicit spillovers between ﬁrms.
34A key mechanism in the model is that market forces tend to make acquisitions with low
synergies unproﬁtable, since rival ﬁrms will then expand their R&D investments, making cross-
border M&As fail. While the model shows that welfare reducing market-power driven foreign
acquisitions of domestic ﬁrms with high-quality assets can arise in equilibrium, the merger prof-
itability requirement implies that foreign acquisitions tend to be eﬃciency-enhancing. In turn,
this implies that acquired aﬃliates will not only invest more in R&D than aﬃliates established
through greenﬁeld entry, but also that foreign acquisitions will lead to an increase in R&D invest-
ment in the target ﬁrm after the acquisition. It is also shown that sequential R&D investments
following eﬃciency-enhancing acquisitions can result in signiﬁcant welfare gains. These ﬁndings
suggest that competition policy, but not a discriminatory policy towards foreigners, might play
an important role in the host country.
How much of the higher R&D intensity of the acquired aﬃliates is due to synergies in the
acquisition and how much is due to a high initial quality of the target ﬁrm’s R&D assets? It might
be argued that this question is best studied by examining the pre- and post-performance of target
ﬁrms, where our model predicts that R&D intensity would increase after a foreign acquisition
and increase substantially if synergies are large. In the IFN data, there is no information on the
targets prior to the acquisition, so this hypothesis must be tested in other data sources. However,
it is important to stress the problem associated with a comparative pre- versus post-acquisition
analysis in oligopolistic markets. As shown in Figure 4.1(iii), the increase in R&D generated by
an acquisition would be inﬂated by the market power eﬀect. This will produce an upward bias on
estimates of potential synergies arising in an acquisition in regressions investigating the pre- and
post-performance of the target ﬁrm. In contrast, our comparison between acquired aﬃliates and
greenﬁeld aﬃliates does control for this market power eﬀect which suggests that our empirical
approach is less likely to suﬀer from such a bias.
Future work could examine in more detail how ex-ante MNE characteristics aﬀect potential
synergies and sequential R&D investments in a strategic acquisition-investment-oligopoly frame-
work. Table A4 in the appendix contains a simple probit regression as an illustration. This
regression shows that larger MNEs choose acquisitions as the entry mode, whereas more R&D
intensive and more productive MNEs prefer greenﬁeld entry. Given that ﬁrms invest more in
R & Di na c q u i r e da ﬃliates, this may suggest that eﬃcient MNEs will use greenﬁeld aﬃliates for
assembly and marketing, while keeping their R&D activities at home to avoid technology transfer
35costs.24 In contrast, less eﬃcient MNEs need to exploit synergies associated with the domestic
target ﬁrm’s assets in order to make the acquisition proﬁtable. Consequently, in the perspective
of host country R&D, the largest positive externalities might not come from the investor with
the highest productivity, but rather from the investor with the largest gain from acquiring local
R&D assets.
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39A. Appendix
A.1. The Linear Quadratic model
Table A.1: Optimal quantities as functions of ownership structure.
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We use unique data from a survey of the foreign activities of Swedish multinational ﬁrms. This
survey has been carried out by the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) since the
1970’s. The purpose of this survey has been to collect information on the foreign operations of all
Swedish ﬁrms with: (i) their main activity in the manufacturing sector, (ii) at least 50 employees,
and (iii) at least one producing aﬃliate abroad and their domicile in Sweden. Data on R&D
expenditures in aﬃliates is available from ﬁve surveys: 1970, 1978, 1990, 1994 and 1998.25 The
coverage of the survey data ranges between 77 to 95 percent for participating multinationals and
71 to 100 percent for their producing aﬃliates. Thus, the answering rate is very high both among
parent ﬁrms and their aﬃliates. There is a slight decline in 1998 but the answering rate is still
high, reaching almost 80 percent.
25Data also exists for 1965, 1974 and 1986, but these surveys do not include aﬃliate R&D.
40Data allows us to follow the same multinational for several years. In earlier surveys, about
70 percent of the ﬁrms remain in at least two consecutive surveys. In later surveys, about half
of the ﬁrms remain in the sample in two consecutive surveys. This decline may be due to a
decrease in the answering rate. Another explanation is that several large Swedish MNEs such as
Pharmacia, Astra, Volvo and SAAB were no longer included in the sample as they were acquired
by or merged with foreign ﬁrms when the regulation against foreign acquisitions of Swedish ﬁrms
was lifted in the 1990s.
The relative importance of foreign operations of Swedish MNEs has, however, increased
during the period studied. In 1970, overseas employment was about 40 percent while in 1998,
it had increased to almost 70 percent. Swedish multinationals play a crucial role in Sweden’s
manufacturing sector. In 1999, Swedish MNEs accounted for about 45 percent of the value
added, 62 percent of Swedish exports, 43 percent of Swedish total manufacturing employment
and roughly 62 percent of the R&D expenditures (ITPS, 2002).
Table A1 displays the distribution of aﬃliates in the sample by entry mode, year, region and
industry.
A.3. Variables and Descriptive Statistics
In the regressions, we include a set of variables at the aﬃliate, parent and country level to control
for other determinants of aﬃliate R&D. Most variables are expressed in log form and all variables
with a monetary value are converted into US dollars in the constant value of 1995 (see tables A2
and A3 below for variable description and summary statistics). To measure R&D activity in the





where R&Dit is total outlays for R&D in aﬃliate i at time t and Salesit is the aﬃliate’s corre-
sponding total sales. Thus, we normalize R&D expenditures with total sales to control for size
eﬀects and express the intensity in percentage points. Using the intensity, we also control for
omitted variables that have a similar eﬀect on the aﬃliate’s choice of R&D expenditures and
sales.26
26Thus, to avoid endogeneity problems, we will not include aﬃliate size in the regressions as one of the explana-
tory variables.
41Table A1. Entry mode of FDI.
Year MA GI Total Share in
Number Total
1970 100 228 328 0.15
1978 154 227 381 0.18
1990 306 189 495 0.23
1994 346 202 548 0.25
1998 290 129 419 0.19
Total 1196 975 2171 1.00
Region
Europe 916 565 1481 0.68
North America 178 181 359 0.17
South America 53 118 171 0.08
Other Developing Countries 26 61 87 0.04
Other Developed Countries 23 50 73 0.03
Total 1196 975 2171 1.00
Industry
Resource-intensive 173 91 264 0.12
Labor-intensive 211 227 438 0.20
Scale-intensive 369 282 651 0.30
Diﬀerentiated Goods 350 260 610 0.28
Science Based 88 112 200 0.09
Total 1191 972 2163 1.00
At the aﬃliate level, we include the age of an aﬃliate, deﬁned as the number of years that the
aﬃliate has been part of the MNE (Age) and the export intensity of the aﬃliate (Export). Age
captures the eﬀe c to ft i m eo na ﬃliate R&D and Export the aﬃliate type. High export intensity
may indicate that the aﬃliate is used as a hub for regional or world markets and such aﬃliates
are more likely to function as R&D centers adapting technologies and creating new knowledge
(see e.g. Håkansson and Nobel, 1993).
We control for the impact of the R&D intensity of the parent ﬁrm (RD Parent), the share
of foreign R&D in total R&D of the parent ﬁrm (RD Abroad) and the number of years since
the ﬁrst overseas R&D investment of the parent ﬁrm (Experience). In general, the relationship
between the parent ﬁrm’s R&D and overseas R&D is not straightforward. On the one hand, a
42parent ﬁrm in a high-technology sector might require a high level of R&D expenditures abroad
to adapt high-technology products to the local market and transfer technological knowledge. On
the other hand, it may also be costly to protect propriety technologies from being dissipated.
If such measures require large resources, the ﬁrm may concentrate R&D to the home country
(Norbäck, 2001).
The overseas R&D activities may also be a function of corporate experience and growth.
As the foreign operations become more important, the role of overseas R&D may change from
supportive to creative, thus leading to an increase in aﬃliate R&D (see e.g. Odagiri and Yasada,
1996). The experience of overseas R&D is believed to promote the eﬃciency of R&D activities
abroad and facilitate the coordination with the network of R&D centers. We add RD Abroad
and Experience to capture these eﬀects. Finally, we include the total size of the parent ﬁrm (Size
Parent) and the labor productivity of the parent company (Prod Parent) as additional controling
variables at the ﬁrm level.
Furthermore, we control for host country characteristics including income level (GDP cap),
market size (GDP) and the distance between Sweden and the host country (Distance). It is likely
that demand for R&D and the supply of assets with potential synergies arising from acquisitions
are larger in countries with a higher development level and/or a higher market size. This would, in
particular, be important for R&D investments in acquired aﬃliates.27 The geographical distance
may obstruct technology transfers by making communication as well as supervision of R&D
activity abroad more diﬃcult.
In the selection equation of the Heckman estimations (2.1), we add an index of property
rights (IPR) from Ginarte and Park (1997). Multinational ﬁrms should be more reluctant to
set up an R&D center when the protection for intellectual property rights is weak. Indeed, the
IPR is expected to have a greater impact on the decision of whether to locate an R&D center
abroad than on the level of R&D, since it constitutes one major determinant of anticipated total
discounted future beneﬁts from R&D activities. IPR may be less relevant for R&D intensity,
27M&As could, in fact, be an unrealistic alternative for greenﬁeld investments if the supply of suitable target
ﬁrms is limited as in developing countries with underdeveloped asset markets. Besides, foreign acquisitions are
restricted in many developing countries. On the other hand, in some situations greenﬁeld investment is not an
alternative to M&As. For instance, during ﬁnancial crises or large privatization programs, the supply of target
ﬁrms overshadows the role of greenﬁeld entry. We partly control for these last two aspects by introducing year,
regional and industries dummies.
43since improved property rights protection may increase both R&D expenditures and aﬃliate
sales. In the selection equation, we also add aﬃliate size since a larger aﬃliate is expected be
more likely to perform R&D.
We use dummy variables for year, industry and region.28 Our industry dummy variables
are deﬁned as ﬁve broader categories according to a taxonomy in OECD (1987, 1992): resource
intensive, labor intensive, scale intensive, diﬀerentiated goods and science based goods. We use
regional dummy variables deﬁned as ﬁve main geographical areas, Europe, North America, South
America, Developing Countries in Asia and Africa and Developed Countries in Asia and Paciﬁc.
Table A2. Variable description.
Variable name Deﬁnition Source
Age ln(the number of years the aﬃliate has been IFN
part of the corporation)
Export aﬃliate exports to sales IFN
Size Aﬃliate ln(aﬃliate sales) IFN
Size Parent ln(total corporate sales) IFN
Prod Parent ln( total sales
total number of employees ∗ 100)I F N
RD Parent ln( R&D
total sales ∗ 100)I F N
RD Abroad
(total parent R&D−parent R&Di nS w e d e n )
total parent R&D IFN
Experience ln(the number of years since the ﬁrst R&D IFN
investment abroad)
Distance ln(the greater circle distance between capitals) Penn World Tables
GDP cap ln(GDP per capita) WDI, World Bank
GDP ln(GDP) WDI, World Bank
IPR Index of intellectual property rights Ginarte and Park (1997)
Past number of MAs The number of M&As in the country IFN
over the last three years within the industry
Exchange rate
localcurrencyperUSDt
localcurrencyperUSDt−5 Penn World Tables
28We also use country and/or parent ﬁrm dummies. This does not qualitatively change our conclusions. We do
not report these results, but they are available upon request.
44Table A3. Summary Statistics.




















Number of obs. 2063
Notes: 1) variables are expressed in log form. All variables with a monetary
value are converted into US dollars in the constant value of 1995.
A.4. Entry Mode Choice
In the probit model for entry mode choice (Table A4 below), we use two additional variables
i nt h et h a th a v ea ni m p a c to nt h et r a d e - o ﬀ b e t w e e nM & Aa n dg r e e n ﬁeld investment: Exchange
rate and Past Number MAs. Exchange rate gives the units of local currency per USD at time t
related to the units of local currency per USD at t − 5. A higher value of the variable implies
a currency depreciation in the last ﬁve years and hence a lower price for acquisition objects. It
is expected to increase FDI through M&As as shown by Blonigen (1997). Past Number MAs,
deﬁned as the number of Swedish M&As within an industry in a country over the last three years,
captures both the behavior of MNEs and the supply of local targets. MNEs may ﬁrst acquire to
imitate each other and then to minimize their business risk (Schenk, 1996) or to obtain market
power and/or prevent competitors from having an advantage in a country. It should be noted
that the variable GDP also proxies the target supply: larger countries are more likely to have a
higher M&A activity.








































Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the
one,** at the ﬁveand * at the ten percent level. Time and
region dummies are included.
46Table 1. Pooled Heckman estimations.
First stage Second stage First-Stage Probit Second-Stage OLS
Variable Probit OLS Age≤88 <Age≤20 Age≤88 <Age≤20
MA_GI 0.347*** 0.376*** 0.410*** 0.316** 0.333** 0.534***
(0.077) (0.091) (0.127) (0.136) (0.163) (0.165)
Age -0.006** -9.6E-05 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.024) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015)
Export 0.371*** 0.966*** 0.539*** 0.488* 0.761*** 1.198***
(0.124) (0.141) (0.180) (0.231) (0.215) (0.238)
Size Parent -0.247*** -0.113*** -0.245*** -0.151*** -0.107*** -0.042
(0.026) (0.022) (0.038) (0.048) (0.029) (0.038)
Prod Parent 0.171 0.277* 0.345* -0.048 0.517*** -0.174
(0.125) (0.143) (0.182) (0.260) (0.197) (0.262)
RD Parent 0.414*** 0.791*** 0.491*** 0.379*** 0.840*** 0.866***
(0.047) (0.067) (0.064) (0.085) (0.085) (0.131)
RD Abroad 1.201*** 1.515*** 1.583*** 0.636** 2.195*** 0.960***
(0.149) (0.197) (0.220) (0.285) (0.280) (0.317)
Experience 0.017*** 0.003 0.005* 0.012*** -0.007** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Distance -0.235*** -0.452*** -0.465*** 0.070 -0.564*** -0.108
(0.088) (0.120) (0.152) (0.215) (0.193) (0.226)
GDP -0.035 0.176*** -0.047 -0.090 0.143** 0.068
(0.038) (0.042) (0.058) (0.075) (0.063) (0.076)
GDP cap -0.063 -0.144 -0.112 0.142 -0.199 0.589
(0.131) (0.217) (0.246) (0.407) (0.332) (0.417)
IPR 0.250** 0.131 0.369** 0.135 0.319 -0.153
(0.101) 0.139 (0.167) (0.199) (0.230) (0.252)
Size Aﬃliate 0.412*** 0.420*** 0.372***
(0.033) (0.049) (0.060)
Labor intensive 0.030 0.258* 0.114 -0.001 0.096 0.611**
(0.129) (0.145) (0.192) (0.247) (0.200) (0.294)
Scale intensive -0.109 0.073 -0.090 0.127 0.129 0.757***
(0.116) (0.140) (0.160) (0.235) (0.175) (0.280)
Diﬀerentiated goods 0.286** 0.753*** 0.509*** 0.341 0.799*** 1.427***
(0.22) (0.143) (0.172) (0.237) (0.192) (0.294)
Science based -0.054 1.011*** -0.082 0.293 0.719*** 1.710***
(0.168) (0.184) (0.266) (0.309) (0.255) (0.339)
Constant 1.076 -3.295 0.100 -1.663 -1.733 -10.772**
(1.610) (2.404) (2.886) (4.424) (3.465) (4.990)
Lambda 1.478*** 1.327*** 2.039***
(0.163) (0.218) (0.329)
No. obs 2063 862 970 595 370 272
Pseudo R2/R2 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.26 0.41 0.43
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,** at the ﬁve
and * at the ten percent level. Time and region dummies are included.
47Table 2. Heckman estimations for the 1970’s and 1990’s.
1970’s 1990’s
Variable 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
MA_GI 0.457*** 0.728*** 0.304*** 0.288***
(0.154) (0.210) (0.096) (0.098)
Age -0.006 -0.003 -0.009** -0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Export 0.230 1.496*** 0.413*** 0.826***
(0.279) (0.341) (0.142) (0.154)
Size Parent -0.438*** -0.332*** -0.206*** -0.084***
(0.070) (0.079) (0.028) (0.021)
Prod Parent 0.096 -0.781** 0.111 0.373***
(0.225) (0.381) (0.163) (0.144)
RD Parent 0.208** 0.317* 0.472*** 0.906***
(0.082) (0.165) (0.057) (0.068)
RD Abroad 2.356*** 2.208*** 1.025*** 1.562***
(0.383) (0.549) (0.167) (0.187)
Experience 0.026*** 0.014** 0.013*** 9.20E-04
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Distance 0.258 -0.765** -0.410*** -0.503***
(0.205) (0.346) (0.106) (0.124)
GDP -0.185 0.178* 0.011 0.185***
(0.089) (0.094) (0.044) (0.043)
GDP cap 0.546* -0.839 0.286* 0.123
(0.290) (0.627) (0.161) (0.204)
IPR 0.119 -0.044 0.356*** 0.308
(0.217) (0.324) (0.124) (0.151)
Size Aﬃliate 0.489*** 0.419***
(0.079) (0.039)
Labor int. 0.230 0.882** 0.058 0.309**
(0.260) (0.440) (0.158) (0.146)
Scale int. 0.016 0.236 0.143 0.021
(0.234) (0.387) (0.140) (0.140)
Diﬀerentiat. 0.824*** 1.823*** 0.215 0.687***
(0.226) (0.405) (0.152) (0.147)
Science 0.516** 2.182*** 0.186 0.898***
(0.294) (0.530) (0.211) (0.188)
Lambda 0.919*** 1.733***
(0.248) (0.174)
Constant -3.288 -7.793 2.784 -4.575**
(3.501) (7.519) (2.045) (2.240)
No. obs 678 177 1385 685
Pseudo R2/R2 0.37 0.52 0.27 0.40
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** signiﬁcant at the one,
** at the ﬁve and * at the ten percent level. Time and region dummies
are included.
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